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NOTES
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
PAIN AND SUFFERING CAP
INTRonucTioN
In response to a perceived medical malpractice crisis, 1 the 1986 Massachusetts leg-
islature promulgated An Act Relative to Medical Malp•actice, 2 which marks significant
changes in the laws governing medical malpractice liability actions.' The Act, declared
an emergency act by Governor Dukakis, 4 amends a number of existing state medical
malpractice and civil procedure laws, and enacts a number of new statutory provisions'
in an attempt to alleviate the perceived medical malpractice crisis which recently has
received much media attention within the Commonwealth(' and throughout. the country.?
Possibly the most controversial provision of the Act is section 60H of chapter 231 of the
(There is much debate as to whether a medical malpractice crisis actually exists. Many com-
mentators attribute the high cost of medical malpractice insurance to the cyclical nature of the
insurance industry and not to deficiencies in the medical malpractice tort system. See Londrigan,
The Medical Malpractice "Crisis": Underwriting Losses and Windfall Profits, TRIAL, May 1985, at 22;
Medical Malpractice Legislation and the Insurance Industry: Hearings Before the joint Comm. on Insurance
of the Mass. Gen. Court. March 19. 1986 (statement of Michael R. Lemov, Coalition for Consumer
Justice) thereinafter Coalition for Consumer Justice].
2 Ch. 351, 1986 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 310 (Law Co-op.).
3 Medical malpractice has been defined as "the improper treatment or culpable neglect of a
patient by a provider of health care," Note, The Massachusetts Medical Malpractice Statute: A Consti-
tutional Perspective, 11 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1289, 1289, it,1 (1977) (quoting INTERIM REPORT OF 'rue
SPECIAL. COMMISSION ESTABLISIIED To MAKE AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY INSURANCE AND THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES or MEDICAL. MALPRACTICE, MASS. H, R.
REP. No. 4380, 18 (1976)).
Letter from Governor Michael S. Dukakis to Secretary of State Michael J. Connolly ( July 23,
1986) (declaring the "Act Relative To Medical Malpractice" an emergency act) (available at the
Boston College Law Review office).
5 An Act Rehitive to Medical Malpractice. Ch. 351,,1986 Mass. Adv. Legis, Serv. 310 (1986)
(Law. Co-op.). Sections 20 and 21 pertain to medical malpractice tribunals and arc codified at MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, §§ ti and 60E3 respectively. Sections 23, 29, and 80 address changes in
the statute of limitations, and are codified at MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 231, § liOD, and ch. 260,
§ 4. Section 24 outlines the itemization of damages and is codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN, Ch.
231, § 601'. Section 25 discusses changes in the collateral source rule and is codified at MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60G, Section 27 relates to attorneys' fees and is codified at MASS. GEN. LAws
ANN. Cll. 231, § 601. Section 26 addresses limits on pain and suffering awards and is codified at
Mass. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 231, §
"See, e.g., Boston Globe, Aug. 26, 1985, at 43, col, 6; Boston Globe, March 31, 1985, at AS,
col. I; Boston Globe, Jan. 14, 1985, at 37, cot. 1.
7 Sec, e.g., Physician's Financial News, Apr. 15, 1085, at 1, col. 4; Boston Globe, Sept. 9, 1985,
at 4I, col. 6; G. Easterbrook, The Revolution in Medicine, NEwswEEK, Jan. 26. 1087, at 62-63.
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660	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 29:659
Massachusetts General Laws. 8 Section 60H places a cap on awards in medical malpractice
liability actions, limiting for the first time the medical malpractice plaintiffs' recovery
rights in Massachusetts. 9
Section 60H provides that in any action for medical malpractice, the court shall
instruct the jury to grant full economic damages, but, with the exception of certain
severely harmed plaintiffs, to limit the plaintiff's general damages to $500,000.'° General
damages, also known as noneconomic damages, include such intangible items as pain
and suffering, loss of companionship, embarrassment, loss of enjoyment of life, and
physical and mental disability." These damages differ from special damages, or economic
damages, which compensate plaintiffs for economic losses such as medical expenses, lost
wages, and impaired future earning capacity. 18
Several states have enacted statutes similar to section 60H and the majority of these
have received constitutional scrutiny in the courts. The results of this scrutiny have been
inconsistent." Some states havb upheld statutory limits on a plaintiff's recovery in med-
ical malpractice" while others have overturned the statutes on fourteenth amendment
and state equal protection grounds." Recently, the United States Supreme Court dis-
8 See Boston Globe, Jan. 14, 1985, at 37, col. 2. The article states:
The most controversial of [the] measures {being considered by the legislature]
involves placing a cap on the amount juries can award for pain and suffering in
malpractice cases. It is these awards, given to plaintiffs above the amounts they receive
to pay for medical care and loss of income, that often inflate cases beyond their worth,
[doctors] say.
Lawyers counter, however, by saying that doctors have exaggerated the effects of
malpractice suits on medical costs and are seeking to win special protection that would
in effect limit their liability in negligence cases - a protection no other segment of
society enjoys.
Id.
An Act Relative to Medical Malpractice, ch. 351, § 26, 1986 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 310, 336-
37, (1986) (Law. Co-op.), codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 231, § 60H [hereinafter section
601-1].
711 Id.
"
12 See 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 18.01, at 18-3 (1960). See generally
Bauer, Fundamental Principles of the Law of Damages in Medico-Legal Cases, 19 TENN. L. REV. 255
(1946).
See Continent, Limitation on Recovery of Damages in Medical Malpractice Cases; A Violation of
Equal Protection?, U. Cm L. REV. 1329, 1330 (1986).
" State courts have upheld medical malpractice statutes limiting recovery in California, see Fein
v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal, 3d 137, 164, 695 P.2d 665, 684, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 387
(statute limiting recovery for general damages to $250,000 held constitutional under federal and
state constitutions), appeal denied, 474 U.S. 893, (1985), in Indiana, see Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp.,
Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 400, 404 N.E.2(1 585, 601 (1980) (statute limiting total recovery for patient
injury or death to $500,000 held constitutional against federal and state challenge), and in Nebraska,
see Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 114, 256 N.W.2c1 657, 668-69 (statute limiting total recovery
for patient injury to $500,000, unless patient has previously elected not to come within the act's
provisions, held constitutional under federal and state constitutions). A federal circuit court upheld
the California statute in Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1437 (9th Cir. 1985).
' 5 Comment, Limitation on Recovery, supra note 13, at 1330. State courts have overturned medical
malpractice statutes limiting recovery in Illinois, see Wright v. Central Dul'age Hosp. Ass'n., 63 III.
2d 313, 331, 347 N.E.2d 736, 744 (1976) (statute violated federal and slate constitutions); North
Dakota, see Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978) (statute violated federal and state
constitutions); New Hampshire, see Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 943, 424 A.2d 825, 838 (1980)
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missed an appeal of the California Supreme Court's finding that a state statute limiting
a malpractice plaintiff's recovery for noneconomic damages to $250,000 is constitu-
tional,'" thereby tacitly upholding the constitutionality of that statute." Because statutes
similar to the Massachusetts damage limitation provision have been challenged on con-
stitutional grounds in several state and federal courts,'" and the United States Supreme
Court has not yet definitively ruled on the issue,'" a constitutional challenge to section
60H, based on both state and federal equal protection guarantees, is probable."
This note analyzes the constitutionality of section 601-1 of the Massachusetts General
Laws chapter 231 and assesses its effectiveness as a response to the perceived medical
malpractice crisis. Section 1 briefly traces the evolution of the perceived medical mal-
practice crisis and comments on its causes and effects. 21
 This section also examines the
various state legislative responses nationally to the perceived crisis. 22 Section II reviews
the legislative responses to an earlier malpractice crisis in Massachusetts and outlines the
evolution and severity of the present "crisis" in the state." This section also examines
section 60H as a response to the perceived Massachusetts crisis, compares section 6014
with similar damage limitation statutes enacted in other states and assesses the statute's
effect on the perceived Massachusetts medical malpractice problem:4' Section I I I reviews
the principles of equal protection analysis" and examines the application of these prin-
(statute violated state and federal constitutions); Ohio, see Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d
316, 321, 343 N.E.2c1 832, 839 (1970) (in dicta, court found statute violated state and federal equal
protection guarantees); Texas, see 1)etar Hosp. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)
(statute violated federal and state constitutions),
i" Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2c1 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal
denied, 474 U.S. 893, (1985) (upholding CAL. Ctv, Cone § 3333.2 (West 1975)).
17
 Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 474 U.S. 893, 894. Dissenting in the vote to dismiss the
appeal, Justice White noted that because the issue of statutory caps in medical malpractice cases
divides the appellate and highest courts in several states, it is worthy of' review by the Court: "Given
the continued national concern over the 'malpractice crisis,' it is likely that more states will enact
similar types of limitations, and that the issue will recur." Id.
The case came before the Supreme Court as art appeal rather than on a petition for certiorari
and the Court dismissed for lack of a substantial federal question thereby, in effect, affirming the
case on its merits. Comment, Limitation on Recovery, supra note 13, at 1346 (citing Hicks v. Miranda,
422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975) (summary dismissals for lack of a substantial federal question are
decisions on the merits that should be treated as such by lower courts)),
13 See ,supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
19
 See supra note 16-17 and accompanying text.
2°
 This note evaluates only equal protection challenges to § 6011 of chapter 231 of the Massa-
chusetts General Laws. Plaintiffs may also challenge the statute on state and federal due process
grounds. For a discussion of the due process challenges to damage limiting statutes similar to § 601-1,
see Redish, Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications,
55 TEX. L. Rev. 759, 784 (1977). See generally Note, Constitutional Perspective, supra note 3, at 1304.
2' infra notes 28-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history and the various
causes and effects of the perceived medical malpractice crisis.
" See infra notes 52-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various state legislative
responses to the perceived medical malpractice crisis.
23
 See infra notes 80-119 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history alit! severity of
the medical malpractice crisis in Massachusetts.
" See infra notes 120-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of § 601H1, a comparison of
§ 601-I with other states' damage limitation schemes, and an assessment of the effect of these types
of statutes in alleviating the perceived medical malpractice crisis.
23 See infra notes 143-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the principles of equal
protection analysis.
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ciples to state liability limiting laws similar to that enacted by Massachusetts. 26 Section 11/
proposes the proper equal protection test for evaluating the Massachusetts legislation
and concludes that because it violates state and federal equal protection guarantees,
section 60H is unconstitutional. 27
I. THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE "CRISIS"
A. The Evolution of the Problem
Disagreement and confusion regarding the causes of the national medical malprac-
tice crisis plagued the insurance industry and the legal and medical professions in the
mid-1970s. 28 As a result,' the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare
commissioned a study to investigate the situation. 2° The study found that during the
early and mid-1970s, as a consequence of the increasing number of medical malpractice
claims, medical malpractice insurance'° rates increased and the availability of insurance
coverage decreased. This precipitated a much publicized'] medical malpractice crisis."
In response to increases in the number of claims, between 1960 and 1970, for example,
insurance rates for surgeons rose 949.2 percent; for nonsurgical physicians, 540.8 per-
cent; and for hospitals, 262.6 percent." In several states premiums rose more than 100
percent between 1965 and 1975 alone." Additionally, during this period the number of
insurance carriers writing medical malpractice insurance nationally decreased from ap-
proximately eighty-five to five." Thus, the malpractice crisis of the mid-1970s was
characterized by problems in both the affordability and availability of medical malpractice
insurance for health care providers."
26 See infra notes 170-269 and accompanying text for an examination of the application of
equal protection principles to state liability limiting statutes similar to § 60H.
27 See infra notes 270-329 and accompanying text for a discussion and application of the proper
standard of equal protection review that the Massachusetts courts should adopt in evaluating the
constitutionality of § 60H.
26 See Ackerman, Medical Malpractice: A Time for More Talk and Less Rhetoric, 37 MERCER L. Rev.
725,726-28 (1986).
2'j U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, HEW PUB. No. (OS) 73.88, MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMM O N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973) (comprehensive
analysis of the precipitating factors and subsequent effects of the medical malpractice crisis) [here-
inafter HEW REPORT].
" Id. at 38. Professional liability insurance indemnifies health care providers, protects their
personal and professional assets, and compensates victims of malpractice. Id.
s ' See Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation — A First Checkup, 50 Tut.. L. REV. 655,
655 n. I (1976).
" U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPOR'F To CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE: No AGREEMENT ON THE PROBLEMS OR SOLUTIONS, 12 (1986) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
55 HEW REPORT, supra note 29, at 13.
54 Redish, Constitutional Implications, supra note 20, at 760.
55 Id. at 760 n.4 But cf. HEW REPORT, supra note 29, at 38-39 ("The Commission [finds' that
malpractice insurance is currently available to health-care practitioners under group plans and the
market for such insurance is competitive .... [A] health-care provider usually can find several
companies willing to provide the needed coverage.").
96 GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 12.
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Although the causes of the medical malpractice insurance crisis are many and
varied," it is generally agreed that rapid and unanticipated increases in the number and
amount of malpractice awards coupled with the financial peculiarities of the insurance
industry were the primary factors driving insurance rates up and availability down."
For insurance companies underwriting medical malpractice insurance, sustained profit-
ability depends on their ability to estimate potential losses from medical malpractice
claims." Because of the delay between the occurrence of a plaintiff's injury and the time
she files a claim, it is often difficult for insurers to predict potential losses and set accurate
insurance rates.'t° In addition to this inherent industry-wide difficulty, many medical
malpractice insurers in the mid-1970s found that they had underestimated their potential
claim losses ." due to "the unpredictability of soaring jury awards and [the] increasing
frequency of claims." 42
 The increases in claim frequency" and severity" coupled with
the complexities of predicting losses in the medical malpractice insurance industry thus
appear to have sparked the perceived malpractice insurance crisis during the mid-I 970s.
The malpractice insurance crisis affected physicians, patients, and the entire health
care system:* Physicians throughout the country experienced greater difficulty in finding
coverage" and those who were fortunate enough to do so also found dramatic increases
in their premiuins. 47
 Also, in response to their fear of being sued, many physicians began
to engage in what has been termed "defensive medicine," -* ranging in form from
"The HEW Report states: "[T]here is no uniquely identifiable 'malpractice problem,' but.
rather, a complex of problems involving interacting medical, legal, sociological, psychological, and
economic factors." HEW REPORT, .supra note 29, at 4.
38 GAO REemer, .supra note 32, at 18.
99 Id, at 12.
Id, Medical malpractice insurers offer two types of insurance policies: "occurrence" and
"claims matte" policies. Occurrence policies cover claims for a year of a physician's practice wit hout
regard to when the claims arc reported. Thus, a future claim for malpractice is covered by I he
occurrence policy if it occurred in the year in which the occurrence policy was in effect. For
example, a claim brought in 1988 fur a 1987 injury would be covered by a 1987 occurrence policy.
Claims made policies cover claims reported in a single year, regardless of when the medical
service which constitutes malpractice is rendered. Thus, regardless of the date of occurrence, the
physician is covered for any claim in a year in which he or she has a claims made policy. For
example, a claim brought in 1988 for a 1987 injury would be covered by a 1988 claims made policy.
JUA Or MASSACIIUSETI'S, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, 8 ( June 1985).
4 ' GAO Rtu'owr, supra note 32, at 12.
42
 The Pftrblerns of Insuring Medical Malpractice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public. Welfare on Examination of the Continuing Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis,
94th Cong., 1st Sess., 183, 185 (1975) (statement of a representative of a major medical malpractice
insurance underwriter) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
43
 St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, a national medical malpractice insurer, re-
ported an increase in the ratio of claims pending per number of doctors insured, from one claim
for every twenty-three doctors insured in 1969 to one claim for every ten doctors insured in 1974.
Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 186.
44
 St. Paul Fire and Marine reported that the average value of a claim rose front $6,705 in 1969
to $12,534 in 1974. Id,
4 " See Radish, Constitutional Implications, supra note 20, at 760.
4"
 Insurance companies' withdrawal or threatened withdrawal from the inedict.d malpractice
insurance market decreased insurance availability in a number of states, including Florida, New
York, California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Nevada, Maryland, Idaho, and Pennsylvania. GAO RE-
PORT, supra note 32, at 13. But of HEW REPORT, supra note 29, at 38.
47 See HEW REPORT, supra note 29, at 13.
" See id. at 14. The Report states: Illiefensive medicine is the alteration of modes of medical
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ordering extensive and costly diagnostic procedures to screening patients to eliminate
those persons thought likely to sue. 19 Some physicians avoided high risk specialties or
relocated to areas with lower insurance rates, which affected the distribution of available
medical services." Those patients still able to obtain desired medical care paid for the
insurance crisis in the form of higher costs passed on to them by physicians." Thus, the
entire health care system suffered from the effects of the medical malpractice insurance
crisis.
B. Legislative Response to the Crisis
The disruptions in the health care community caused by the crisis prompted the
American Medical Association (AMA) to lobby state legislatures intensively" to enact
remedial legislation aimed at alleviating the insurance availability and affordability prob-
lems physicians suddenly faced." In response to these lobbying efforts, a majority of
states passed legislation designed to make malpractice insurance available at affordable
rates." Twenty-four states, including Massachusetts, adopted statutory provisions estab-
lishing short term joint underwriting associations ( JUA's). 55 These associations sought
to ensure the availability of professional liability coverage by requiring that all private
liability insurance carriers in a state join together to supply such coverage as was re-
quested by the state insurance commissioner who oversaw the association and set mal-
practice insurance rates. 5" The commissioners were empowered to establish JUA's in
practice, induced by the threat of liability, for the principal purposes of forestalling the possibility
of lawsuits by patients as well as providing a good legal defense in the event such lawsuits are
instituted." Id. Between 50 and 70 percent of physicians polled in a mid-1970s survey reported that
they engaged in various forms of defensive medicine. Id.
4"' See M. Cooper, Liability Insurance Squeeze, EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS, Vol. 11, No. 21, at
907 (1985).
See Kalish, C'on•tittaiaal Implications, supra note 20, at 760.
51 See HEW REPOR•, supra note 29, at 12-13 ("[A]pproximately 50 cents of the daily cost to
every patient going into the hospital is for the hospital's malpractice insurance.").
See Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid Pro
Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARV. J. os LEois. 143, 144 (1981).
53 Some commentators have argued that the purported crisis was grossly exaggerated by phys-
icians and insurers and may be attributed to the insurance companies' need for excess profits to
cover stock market losses. For a good discussion concerning the validity of the perceived medical
malpractice crisis, see Ackerman, Less Rhetoric, supra note 28, at 726-28; Aitken, Medical Malpractice:
The Alleged 'Crisis' in Perspective, 637 INS. L. J. 90 (1976).
S 4 See Continent, First Checkup, supra note 31, at 660-61.
55 ALA. CODE § 27-26-20 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-5322 (1980); CAL. INS. CoDE §§ 11891
(West 1988); 9 Cal. Leg. Serv., 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 2 (Sept. 23, 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.351(8)
(West 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-512.1 (Supp. 1975); HAW. Ray. STAT. § 435C-3 (1985); luAno
Com §§ 41-4101-41-4114 (Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 73, §§ 1065.201-.221 (Smith-Hurd
1975); IOWA Com. ANN. § 519A.3 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2402-14 (Supp.
1975); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 557-64 (Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175A, §, 5A
(1975); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 24.12500-24.12517 (Callaghan Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 681A.020(j) (1975); NIL Rev. STAT. ANN. §§ 404-C:1-13 (Stipp. 1975); N.Y. 1Ns. LAW §§ 681-95
(McKinney Stipp. 1975); OHIO Rev. CODE ANN. §§ 3929.71-3929.85 (Baldwin 1975); I'A. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.801-1301.810 (Purdon 1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 69.21 (Law Co-op. 1976);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-4301-15 (Stipp. 1975); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 21.49-3 (Vernon
Stipp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 619.01 (West 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-273 (1973); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 42-62-15 (1969). Comment, First Checkup, supra note 31, at 661 11.37.
5[1
	 First Checkup, supra note 31, at 661.
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order to provide coverage for a period of two to six years while the state legislatures
considered more lasting solutions to the malpractice crisis. 57 JUA's imposed upon the
insurance industry the burden of administering the most affordable medical liability
insurance programs and, by requiring an advance assessment against the insured to
create a stabilization reserve fund, they also worked to protect the industry from suffer-
ing financial loss when claims exceeded premiums in a given year. 58
 Thus, the JUA's
provided short term relief to the availability and affordability problems in a number of
states.
In addition to creating state mandated JUA's, virtually every state enacted sonic
type of medical malpractice tort reform legislation designed to provide immediate, long
term relief to the malpractice crisis. 59 These tort reform measures wrought major changes
in the substantive and procedural rules applicable to the adjudication of medical mal-
practice actions.") The reform proposals included limiting either the amount of a plain-
tiff's recovery" or an individual health care provider's liability," reducing the statute of
limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions," abrogating the plaintiff's use of
the collateral source rule" in medical malpractice actions," requiring medical malpractice
plaintiffs to appear before a pretrial screening panel in all medical malpractice cases,"
limiting the contingent fee amount a plaintiff's attorney may obtain in medical mak
57 Id .
.NH
5" Every state except West Virginia enacted some type of tort reform legislation. AMERICAN
MEDICAL. ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE, PROFESSIONAL.
LIABILITY IN THE '80s, REPORT 2, at 13 (1984) (originally published as a supplement to AM. Men.
NEWS, Nov. 1984) [hereinafter AMA REPoter 2].
In drafting the reform legislation, legislators combined different approaches. As of July 1985,
forty-one states had enacted legislation shortening or modifying the statute of limitations for filing
medical malpractice lawsuits; twenty-three states had legislation limiting attorney contingency fees,
ten states had specific legislation for awarding costs in cases of frivolous actions; twelve states had
legislation limiting health care providers' liability through either compensation funds or caps On
damage awards; seventeen states had legislation eliminating or modifying plaintiffs' use of the
collateral source rule; thirty-two states had legislation eliminating or modifying the ad damnun
clause; eighteen states had legislation allowing for periodic payments of court awards; ten states
had legislation either eliminating or modifying plaintiff's' use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine; ten
states had legislation specifying the qualifications of expert witnesses; twenty-five states had legis-
lation creating mandatory pretrial screening panels; and thirteen states had legislation creating
medical malpractice arbitration boards. See GAO REPORT, supra DOW '32, at 83.
Redish, Constitutional Implications, supra note 20, at 761.
'' See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1985). Under the California statute, recovery
is limited to $250,000 for "noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience,
physical impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary loss." Id.
62 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40,1-11 (1978). The North Dakota statute limits a health care
provider's liability to $300,000 for all claims arising front any one occurrence. Id.
65
 See, e.g., Mtcu. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5838(2) (1986). The Michigan statute reduces the filing
period for medical malpractice claims to six months from the time the plaintiff discovers the
medically negligent injury. Id.
"The collateral source rule excludes evidence of collateral compensation, such as insurance
benefits paid to the plaintiff. For a general discussion of the collateral source rule, see generally
Moceri & Messina, The Collateral Source Rule in Personal Injury Litigation, 7 GoNz. L. REV, 310 (1972).
'i 5 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. Com
 § 3333.1(a) (West Supp. 1985). The California statute abrogates the
collateral source rule, thus permitting a medical malpractice defendant to introduce evidence of
collateral source benefits received by or payable to the plaintiff. Id.
"" See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West 1985).
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practice suits, 67 and requiring that future damages awards in excess of a certain amount
be paid periodically rather than in one lump sum." Legislators presumed that these
enactments would reduce both the number and size of medical malpractice claims and
awards, thereby allowing the insurance industry to predict more accurately expected
pay-outs and thus maintain1 premiums at affordable rates. 6°
Although most states adopted one or more of these various medical malpractice
reform proposals," insurance premiums continued to increase. 7 ' According to the AMA,
between 1975 and 1983, premiums increased by more than eighty percent." Some
commentators attributed these continued increases to the insurance industry's and state
insurance commissioners' refusal to lower premiums because of the uncertainty of pend-
ing litigation challenging the constitutionality of the new reform legislation." Medical
malpractice plaintiffs in many states challenged the various reform statutes on both due
process and equal protection grounds 74 alleging that the statutes unreasonably restricted
or modified their common law rights." Thus, as the number of claims filed" and the
size of medical malpractice jury awards continued to increase," there remained much
disagreement and media attention" regarding the perceived medical malpractice insur-
ance crisis."
II. MASSACHUSETTS' RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS
The mid-1970s Massachusetts malpractice crisis mirrored the national crisis. 8° Fol-
lowing a growing national trend, a major medical malpractice insurer withdrew abruptly
67 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 6146 (West Supp. 1987).
66 See, e.g„ CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1980). Under the California statute, the defen-
dant may pay malpractice judgments for future damages in excess of $50,000 in installments, rather
than in one lump sum. Id.
'59 See Redish, Constitutional Implications, supra note 20, at 761.
'" For a complete listing of the number of states that have enacted specific medical malpractice
reforms, see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
7 ' See Redish, Constitutional Implications, supra note 20, at 761-62.
72 Ackerman, Less Rhetoric, supra note 28, at 727 ("[I]n some areas of the country, harder hit by
more and costlier claims, high risk physicians were being forced to pay annual premiums running
$20,000, $30,000 and even as high as $70,000."). The American Trial Lawyers' Association, however,
reports that medical malpractice insurance premiums represent less than one-half of one percent
of health care costs. Id.
7' See Redish, Constitutional Implications, supra note 20, at 762 (citing Ludlam, Malpractice: Funding
Emerges as a Critical Issue, TRUSTEE, Apr. 1976, at 12).
" For a breakdown of the different reforms enacted in each state and their status as constitu-
tional, 'unconstitutional, or repealed as of July 1985, see AMA REPORT 2, supra note 59, at 20-21.
75 Comment, Medical Malpractice: A Sojourn Through the Jurisprudence Addressing Limitation of
Liability, 30 Loy. L. REV. 119, 120 (1984).
" See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 10. AMA data shows an average of 8.6 claims for every
100 physicians per year during the period 1980-1984. Id.
.	 77 Id,
" See G. Easterbrook, The Revolution in Medicine, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 1987, at 62; AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL. LIABILITY AND INSURANCE, PROFES-
SIONAL. LIABILITY IN THE '80s, REPORT 3 (1985).
" See Londrigan, Underwriting Losses, supra note 1 at 22; Browning, Doctors and Lawyers Face Off,
A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 38.
"See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION RELATIVE 1'0 MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIA-
Burn' INSURANCE AND THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MASS. H.R. REP.
No. 5631, at 7 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 MASS. ANNUAL REPORT].
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from the Massachusetts insurance market, thus decreasing the availability of insurance."
Unprecedented and unanticipated increases in the number of malpractice claims filed,"
coupled with increases in payments and claims expense, also made it difficult for insur-
ance companies to measure the risk of writing medical malpractice insurance," Conse-
quently, those insurers still writing malpractice policies raised their premiums dramati-
cally." These developments made coverage unavailable or unaffordable for many
physicians in the Commonwealth."
Like almost every other state in the country, Massachusetts responded by enacting
a comprehensive medical malpractice bill" designed to insure the continued availability
of affordable medical malpractice insurance." The legislation's immediate objective was
accomplished by establishing a Joint Underwriting Association ( JUA),'"' It was intended
as a "temporary," nonexclusive solution to the impending withdrawal of all major private
carriers of medical malpractice coverage from the Massachusetts market in 1975." Since
its creation, the JUA has been virtually the sole provider of malpractice coverage for
physicians, surgeons, and hospitals in the Commonwealth. 9°
The comprehensive medical malpractice bill" also reformed the tort. law relating to
medical malpractice actions as a long term remedy to the malpractice crisis." The bill
established a board of registration and discipline for the state medical profession," set
new standards for risk classification by the insurance commissioner," required the elim-
ination of the ad clainnuni clause in complaints alleging medical malpractice," reduced
the statute of limitations for minors," and mandated the plaintiff's appearance before
81 Id.
82
 From 1970 to 1975 the number of claims filed in the Commonwealth increased from 122 to
476 a year. Id, at 37, table 10.
83 Id. at 36.
84 1d. at 7.
85 Id.
88
 1975 Mass. Acts 362 (1975).
The preamble of the enactment states,
Whereas, the deferred operation of this act would tend to defeat its purpose, which
is, in part, to guarantee the continued availability of medical malpractice insurance,
therefore it is hereby declared in be an emergency law, necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public convenience.
Id.
8' See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION RELATIVE TO MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIA-
BILITY INSURANCE AND TIIE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MASS. H.R. REP.
No. 5355, at 5 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 MASS. ANNUAL REPORT] (general description of the JUA's
composition); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 175A, § 5A (West Supp. 1986).
89 See ANNUAL REPORT OF TILE SPECIAL COMMISSION RELATIVE 'FO MEDICAL. VROVESSIONAL LIA-
BILITY INSURANCE AND Till: NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MASS, H.R. REP.
No, 5980, at 5 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 MAss, ANNUAL REPORT].
9° Id. at 5. In 1979, the JUA provided malpractice coverage for an average of 9,700 physicians
and surgeons and for 124 hospitals throughout the state. Id. In 1985, these figures were 11,000
and 117 respectively. See 1985 MASS. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 9.
9 ' 1975 Mass. Acts 362.
92 See 1985 MASS. ANNUAL RETORT, supra note 88, at 5.
93 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 13, § 10 (West 1981).
'54 Id. at ch. I75A, § 5 (West Supp. 1986).
95 Id. at ch. 231, § 60C (West 1985).
16 Id. § 60D.
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a Medical Malpractice Tribunal as a prerequisite to a medical malpractice liability trial."
These tort. reforms and the establishment of the JUA seemed to produce the desired
results as both the number of claims and malpractice insurance premiums stabilized
through 1980. 98
In 1981, however, the medical malpractice insurance market in Massachusetts began
to destabilize.99
 In the second half of that year, malpractice claims increased by 50
percent,m° and in response the JUA requested a 57.9 percent rate increase on occurrence
policies,'" which cover all claims for a year of a physician's practice regardless of when
the medical malpractice claim is reported, 10" and a 16 to 56 percent rate increase on
claims made policies, which cover claims reported in a single year regardless of when
the medically negligent act occurred.'" The Massachusetts Medical Society (MMS) ob-
jected to these increases, requesting only a 14.93 percent and a 27 percent increase
respectively." The Commissioner of Insurance allowed a net increase of only 30 percent
on both policies for that year.'"
A similar rate increase was agreed upon by all the interested parties in 1982, 106 but
on April 1, 1983, the JUA filed a recommendation for a 162.7 percent net increase in
medical malpractice insurance rates for physicians for the period of July 1, 1983 to June
30, 1984. 1 °7
 On May 18, 1984, the Commissioner ordered a 42 percent average increase
in rates for the same period. 1 ° 8
 On June 7, 1984, the JUA responded by filing an appeal
with the.Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, alleging that the rates established by the
Commissioner were not "'adequate, just, and reasonable' as required by Massachusetts
General Laws, c. 175A, § 5A,'°9
 and were not 'actuarially sound' and 'calculated to be
self-supporting' as required by suit. 1975, c. 362, § 6.""° The court agreed, reversing
" Id. § 60B.
96
 1985 MASS. ANNUAL REPORT, SUpla note 88, at 6.
99
'°° Id. at 10. Table 1 shows that the number of claims rose from 681 in 1980 to 912 in 1981.
Id.
10 ' Id. at 6.
1 05 See JUA of Massachusetts, Medical Malpractice, at 8 ( June 1985). Thus, a claim of medical
negligence reported ten years after its occurrence is covered by an occurrence policy if the physician
had such a policy during the year the allegedly negligent act took place. id.
'°3 Id.
"N 1985 MASS. ANNUAL REPORT, sn/ira note 88, at 6.
1 °5 id. at 7.
we Id.
"" The Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n of Mass. v. Commissioner of Ins., 395
Mass. 43, 478 N.E.2d 936 (1985).
i"S Id. at. 44, 478 N.E.2d at 938.
' n9 MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 175A, § 5A (West 1985), provides in relevant part:
The commissioner shall, annually on or before December first, after due hearing and
investigation, fix and establish lair and reasonable classification of risks and adequate,
just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory premium charges on claims made and occur-
rence basis to be used and charged by companies in connection with the issue or
execution of medical malpractice insurance for the ensuing calendar year or any part
thereof.
Id.
"Valid Underwriting Ass'n, 395 Mass. at 45, 478 N.E.2d at 938. Statute 1975, c. 362, 6, as
amended by St. 1980, c. 333, provides in relevant part:
Effective after the initial year of operation rates, rating plans and any provision for
recoupment through policyholder assessment or premium rate increase, shall be based
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and remanding the decision to the Commissioner, requiring him to set retroactive rates
for 1983-1984 in accordance with the opinion)" On remand, the Supreme Judicial
Court empowered the Commissioner to set retroactive rates above 50 percent) 12
 Coupled
with the already high rate increases kir 1984-1985, physicians in Massachusetts again
laced excessive premiums and the state once again found itself in the midst of a perceived
medical malpractice crisis in which insurance affordability, not availability, was the prob.
lem. 113
Despite the substantial increases in malpractice insurance premiums, some com-
mentators questioned whether the term "crisis" appropriately characterized the situation
in Massachusetts.° A comparative report to the Medical Society of New York found
that the Massachusetts physicians' average net income in 1985 was $88,700, while their
average malpractice premiums for that year were $4,615. 115
 Thus, in 1985, a Massachu-
setts physician's average insurance premium costs were only 5.2 percent of the physician's
net income. 16
 According to the study, this percentage was the third lowest among the
ten states studied,"' six of which represented the largest in terms of population." 8
Although these figures question the existence of an affordability crisis, the Massachusetts
medical community intensively lobbied the legislature to address the perceived crisis. 119
In 1986 the state legislature responded, passing a major reform bill which the
Governor signed into law on June 23rd of that year. 120
 The Governor described the bill
as "a critical first step in ensuring the availability of first-class affordable health care for
all Massachusetts' citizens and fair compensation for victims of malpractice." 121 Among
the bill's many provisions is section 60H, which mandates that in any medical malpractice
action the court shall instruct the jury that if it finds the defendant liable for medical
negligence, it shall not award the plaintiff' more than $500,000 for pain and suffering,
loss of companionship, embarrassment, and other items of general, noneconomic dam-
age. 122
 This statutory cap, however, can he bypassed if the jury finds a substantial or
upon the association's loss and expense experience, and investment income from
unearned premium and loss reserves together with such other inlOrmation based upon
such experience as the commissioner may deem appropriate. The resultant premiums
rates shall he on an actuarially sound basis and shall be calculated to be self-supporting.
Id.
'" Pint UnderWri fing
	 395 Mass. at 58, 478 N.E.2d at 945.
"'Id.
113 See 1985 MASS, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 7.
IN See Coalition for Consumer J ustice, supra lime 1, at 2. See also Rutigliano, Insurance Crisis for
Doctors? Fantasy, Fact, or Fiction?, TRIAL, May 1986, at 29 (AMA figures belie the existence of any
crisis).
in
 AN ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE EXPENSES AND PHYSICIANS INCOME IN
NEW YORK AND SELECTED STATES, REPORT TO THE MEDICAL SoCIETY OF THE STATE OP NEW YORK 9,
I I, (Sept. 1985) thereinafter REPORT TO Tile MEDICAL SociErvl (prepared by Healthscope Man-
agement Services Corp.).
nr Id. at 11.
" 7 Id.
" 5 Id. at 3.
11, See MASSACHUSETTS MEDICAL. SOCIETY, MALPRACTICE LAW REFORM: EVERYBODY'S BuSINESS,
The MMS submitted a ten bill legislative package to the state legislature in 1985 that was designed
to end the medical malpractice insurance affordability crisis. Id.
120 An Act Relative to Medical Malpractice, Ch. 351, 1986, Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 310 (Law.
Co-op.).
12 ' Governor Michael S. Dukakis, Press Release ( July 23, 1986).
122
 An Act Relative to Medical Malpractice, Chapter 351, § 26, 1986 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv.
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permanent loss or impairment of a bodily function, or substantial disfigurement, or
other special circumstances which would warrant a finding that such limitation would
deprive the plaintiff of just compensation.'" The legislature designed the statutory cap
on noneconomic damages in order to decrease expenses and stabilize medical malpractice
insurance prem in 1115
Legislatures in seventeen other states have enacted statutory provisions limiting the
recovery of damages in medical malpractice litigation. 125 These statutes usually mandate
either an absolute limit on a physician's or hospital's liability, 128 a partial limit on a
physician's or hospital's liability in conjunction with a patient compensation fund which
supplements the plaintiff's recovery, 127 or an absolute limit on noneconomic damages.' 28
The first two approaches limit total damages recoverable while the third permits full
recovery for economic damages but limits noneconomic damages.'"
310 (Law. Go-op.), codified at MASS. GE N. Laws ANN. ch. 231, § 601-1. The statute reads in relevant
part:
In any action for malpractice, negligence, error, omission, mistake or the unauthorized
rendering of professional services, . . . the court shall instruct the jury that in the event
they find the defendant liable, they shall not award the plaintiff more than five
hundred thousand dollars for pain and suffering, loss of companionship, embarrass-
ment, and other items of general damages unless the jury determines that there is a
substantial or permanent loss or impairment of a bodily function or substantial disfig-
urement, or other special circumstances in the case which warrant a finding that
imposition of such a limitation would deprive the plaintiff of just compensation for
the injuries sustained.
Id.
125 Id.
1 " See Comment, Limitation on Recovery, supra note 13, at 1332. The statutory cap was the
product of much legislative compromise. One legislative petition called for a $750,000 limit for
injury or death. See AN ACT RELATIVE TO CERTAIN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAUSES OF ACTION, MASS.
H.R. REP. No. 6809, at 4 (1985). Governor Dukakis submitted a bill requesting a $500,000 cap for
injury or death, including permanent bodily function loss or disfigurement. See AN ACT RELATIVE
To MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, MASS. H.R. REP. No. 6829, 18 (1985). The Committee on
Insurance filed a bill in 1986 that placed no limit on pain and suffering awards to the victim, but
did limit to $250,000 the amount that a relative suing for loss of companionship or wrongful death
could recover. See AN ACT RELATIVE TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, MASS. H.R. REP. No.
5525, at 20 (1986). A Senate bill would have set a statutory cap of $250,000 for injury or death
resulting from medical negligence. See AN ACT RELATIVE TO NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN CERTAIN
ACTIONS AGAINST HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, S. REP. No. 1017, at 1 (1986).
125 See AMA REPORT 2, supra note 59, at 18.
125,
	 e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-11 (1978). The statute limits a health care provider's
liability to $300,000 for all claims arising from any one occurrence. Id.
127 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Burns 1983). The Indiana statute limits the total
recovery for patient injury or death to $500,000, limits the liability of any health care provider to
$100,000 per occurrence, provides that any amount due from a judgment or settlement that exceeds
the health care provider's total liability shall be paid from the patient's compensation fund in an
amount determined by the court. Id,
128 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1985). Under the California statute, recovery
is limited to $250,000 for "noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience,
physical impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage." Id.
129 See Comment, Limitation on Recovery, supra note 13, at 1332-33.
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Along with at least four states, 130
 Massachusetts adopted the third approach: limiting
noneconomic damages to $500,000 with certain exceptions"' while imposing no limit on
the total economic damages a plaintiff may recover.'" In enacting the statutory cap, the
Massachusetts legislature, like legislatures in states with similar provisions, adopted caps
on noneconomic damages in order to reduce the dollar amounts of medical malpractice
awards. The legislature thought that the statutory cap would allow insurers to predict
more accurately plaintiff recoveries and therefore maintain coverage at reasonable
rates.'" Thus, the legislature intended the cap provisions to reduce medical malpractice
premiums and thereby help resolve the perceived crisis." 14
Two recent studies have assessed the effect of statutory caps on the perceived
medical malpractice crisis.'" One study by Patricia Danzon examined the impact of the
various forms of statutory caps during the period from 1975 to 1989, and found that
caps on jury awards reduced the average award by 23 percent.'" The study noted,
however, that the reduction of jury awards attributable to statutory caps did not auto-
matically translate into reduced malpractice premiums — litigation expenses and invest-
ment losses by insurance companies must also be considered. 137
 The Danzon study thus
did not demonstrate conclusively the effect of statutory caps on medical malpractice
premiums.
A second study, however, found that statutory caps did not.reducc medical mal-
practice premiums.'" The study, conducted by Frank Sloan, examined the impact of
several tort reforms, including statutory caps on awards, on the levels and rates of
change in general practitioners' insurance premiums from 1974 to 1978. 1 " For the years
examined, Sloan found that state legislative actions, considered individually or collec-
tively, had no significant impact in reducing physician premiums.'" Thus, according to
the study, statutory caps did not reduce medical malpractice premiums."'
Even though the Danzon and Sloan studies questioned the effectiveness of statutory
caps on jury awards as a means of reducing medical malpractice premiums, Massachu-
setts, as well as several other states, enacted liability limiting statutes in their attempts to
mitigate the effects of a perceived medical malpractice crisis. Medical malpractice plain-
tiffs have challenged these statutes on state and federal equal protection grounds in a
number of states, and courts have reached inconsistent results.'" Because the Massachu-
setts statutory cap limits for the first time a medical malpractice victim's recovery rights,
11' See CAL. C ► V. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507•C:7(11) (Supp,
1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Page 1981); TEX. REV. Cry. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1 1.82(a)
(Vernon Supp. 1982).
"" See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
1s2
I" Sloan, State Responses to the Medical Malpractice Insurance "Crisis" of the 1970's: An Empirical
Assessment, 9 J. HEALTH, Pot_ Pot:y & L. 629, 633 (1985).
j " See Comment, Limitation on Recovery, supra note 13, at 1332.
)" See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 18.
16 Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New Evidence, 49 Law &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 78 (1986).
13 ' Id. at 79.
"6'Sloan, Empirical Assessment, supra note 133, at 640-41.
139 1d. at 629.
Liu Id. at 643.
14, Id,
142 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
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it is likely that its constitutionality will also be tested under state and federal equal
protection guarantees.
III. APPLYING EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS TO STATUTES LIMITING MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
A. Equal Protection Standards
Although liability limiting statutes distinguish medical malpractice victims from all
other tort victims, such distinctions do not per se violate the equal protection guarantees
of federal and state constitutions.' 43 Lawmakers may discriminate among classes of
people when enacting legislation but, in order to satisfy equal protection requirements,
legislation must employ criteria that treat similarly situated people equally.'" Only clas-
sification schemes that are unreasonable or result in invidious discrimination are subject
to invalidation on state and federal equal protection grounds.'" Thus, the pertinent
inquiry is whether medical malpractice plaintiffs whose jury awards are reduced by
statutory damage caps that limit recovery in medical malpractice actions, but not in other
tort actions, have suffered unreasonable or invidious discrimination. 196
When conducting an equal protection analysis of state legislation courts have utilized
three standards of review: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and minimum scrutiny. 147
Under the strict scrutiny standard, a court will uphold legislation only if the state can
demonstrate that the statute advances a compelling state interest and is the least restric-
tive means available to achieve that end.'" Legislation is valid under intermediate scru-
tiny only if' the legislative classification substantially relates to the asserted legitimate state
purpose for the classification.' 19 Under minimum scrutiny, a legislative classification is
constitutional if the means chosen by the legislature rationally relates to a valid state
objective.' 5° According to these standards, the type of statutory classification involved
and the importance of the interest affected by the statute determine the applicable level
of scrutiny for the court's equal protection analysis. 15 '
Courts apply the strict scrutiny standard when a statutory classification discriminates
against a suspect class or threatens a fundamental right. 152 A class is suspect where it
'" See Redish, Constitutional Implications, supra note 20, at 769.
' 4' See Note, Constitutional Perspective, supra note 3, at 1296. See also I'lyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
216, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
145 Redish, Constitutional Implications, supra note 20, at 769. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964) (invidious discrimination); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (unreason-
able classification).
146 Redish, Constitutional Implications, supra note 20, at 769.
" 7 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (intermediate scrutiny); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v, Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973) (strict scrutiny); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970) (minimum scrutiny).
"8 See San Antonio Indep. School D ist., 411 U.S. at 33-34.
149
 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (classification based on gender "must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives").
199 McGowan, 366 U.S. at 425 (statute violates fourteenth amendment only if classification is
irrelevant to state objective).
See Note, Constitutional Perspective, supra note 3, at 1297.
132 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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suffers from such disabilities, as a consequence of a history of purposeful unequal
treatment or a position of political powerlessness, that it requires greater protection than
is afforded by the majoritarian political process.'" Courts have extended fundamental
rights status to individual liberty and political process rights guaranteed by the Consti-
tution. 154 Thus, when a suspect class or fundamental right is involved the state must
show a compelling state interest to justify the statutory classification under the strict
scrutiny standard.'" Generally, courts have not used strict scrutiny to determine the
constitutionality of medical malpractice limitation statutes under equal protection guar-
antees because the common law right to bring an action to recover for injuries is not a
fundamental right, and the class of medical malpractice victims is not a suspect class.'"
Intermediate scrutiny analyzes the relationship between the statutory classification
and the legislative purpose.' 51 A statutory classification passes intermediate scrutiny if'
the means chosen by the legislature substantially further the purported ends of the
legislation, thus requiring the court to investigate the relationship between the means
and ends of a statute.'" Intermediate scrutiny is more deferential to the legislature than
strict scrutiny,'" but presumes that the important rights of those within the legislative
classification should not be abridged absent a substantial fit between the means and ends
of the legislation.'" The United States Supreme Court has generally limited its appli-
cation of this means-ends test to cases involving classifications based on gender and
illegitimacy.""
When reviewing statutory damage limitation provisions, courts have applied inter-
mediate scrutiny and examined limiting the medical malpractice victim's recovery as it
relates to the legislative goals of decreasing insurance premium costs and of maintaining
and improving health care.' 62 For such statutes to pass intermediate level judicial scrutiny,
courts require a substantial relationship or fit between the legislation's means and ends,
and this fit must he close enough to justify the discriminatory effects on those medical
malpractice victims who fall within the statutory classification. 1" 3
155 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 28 (1973). See United States v.
Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 11.4 (1938) (a suspect class is a discrete or insular minority
that is politically powerless clue to circumstances beyond its control).
'" See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to freedom of interstate travel);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, reh'g denied, 351 U.S. 958 (1956) (right to criminal appeal).
1 " Learner, Compensatirm Schemes, supra note 52, at 152.
155 See Comment, Limitation on Recovety, supra note 13, at 1339. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120
N.H. 925, 931-32, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980) ("right to recover for personal injuries is not a
fundamental right"); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.E.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978) (no suspect classification
or fundamental right).
157 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-98.
155 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977) (state must
show that classification is substantially related to important government objective); Reed v, Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (classification must rest on some "difference ... having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation ....").
1 " Redish, Constitutional Implications, supra note 20, at 772.
111" Comment, Limitation on Recovery, supra note 13, at 1339.
151 See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. 190 (gender); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (illegitimacy),
152 See, e.g., Arneson v. Olson, 270 N,E.2d 125, 135 (N.D, 1978); ,Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine,
97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
167 Comment, Limitation on Rummy, supra note 13, at 1340.
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Unlike strict or intermediate scrutiny, minimum scrutiny requires only that the
statutory classification rationally relates to a legitimate government interest.'" Thus,
minimum scrutiny requires that the court inquire into the purpose of the legislation in
order to determine whether the classification rationally relates to that purpose.'" In
applying this test, however, courts generally have deferred to the legislature, holding a
classification valid if any rational basis for creating it can be inferred, 166
 thereby creating
the presumption that the legislature acted reasonably.' 6' This presumption generally
prevents courts from examining relevant facts and statistics in order to determine
whether the legislation enacted actually relates to or furthers a legitimate state end. 168
Whether a medical malpractice damage limitation statute is deemed constitutional
under equal protection guarantees depends on which standard of review a court adopts.
Strict scrutiny does not apply to such a determination because medical malpractice victims
do not constitute a suspect class and the interest in a full recovery in a tort action is not
a fundamental right.' 69
 Thus, in reviewing such statutes, courts may employ either
intermediate or minimum scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny examines the relation between
the statute's means and ends. while minimum scrutiny is more deferential to the legis-
lature.
B. Application of Equal Protection Standards to Statutory Caps
Plaintiffs' primary equal protection challenge to statutes limiting recovery in medical
malpractice actions has been the claim that statutory caps discriminate between medical
negligence victims and places the burden of resolving the perceived medical malpractice
crisis on the most severely injured victims.'" Plaintiffs have also challenged these statutes
on the grounds that they discriminate unfairly between medical malpractice victims and
all other tort victims, and thus create a special privilege for the class of medical tortfeasors
as opposed to all other tortleasors.m The special privilege is created because these
statutes limit only medical malpractice tortfeasors' liability and does not affect the liability
of other malpractice tortfeasors, such as lawyers and dentists.' 72
' 64 See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961).
16 ' Note, Constitutional Perspective, supra note 3, at 1298.
166 See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 425. In McGowan, the Court stated:
ITIlie Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting
laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional
safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to
the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted
within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in
some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
Id.
167 See Redish, Constitutional Implications, supra note 20, at 770-71.
168
 Note, Constitutional Perspective, supra note 3, at 1300.
169 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
170 See Comment, Limitation of Recovery, supra note 13, at 1338. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group, 38 Cal, 3d 137, 161, 695 P.2d 665, 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 385, appeal denied, 474
U.S. 893 (1985); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 931, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980),
17 ' Comment, Limitation on Recovery, supra note 13, at 1338.
172 Id. at 1338-39. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 931, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980);
Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 319, 343 N.E.2d 832, 837 (1976).
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In reviewing the constitutionality of noneconomic damage caps, courts have differed
as to which standard of review applies.'" Courts have applied both the minimum and
intermediate scrutiny tests, but no court has applied a strict scrutiny analysis.'" Courts
applying the minimum scrutiny test have Upheld the constitutionality of statutory limits
on noneconomic damages, linding that they rationally' relate to the legitimate state goals
of decreasing medical malpractice insurance premiums and ensuring the availability of
quality health care. 171 In contrast., those courts applying intermediate scrutiny generally
have not questioned the validity of the asserted legislative ends but have invalidated such
statutes on the grounds that they do not substantially relate to or further those ends. 176
The case law in the states which have ruled on these statutory provisions illustrates the
different approaches and results.
In Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital,'" the Indiana Supreme Court, applying minimum
scrutiny, held that a statute limiting recovery for medical malpractice victims did not
violate equal protection guarantees under either the state or the federal constitutions. 17 "
The Johnson court noted that the legislation classified plaintiffs, imposing a burden upon
malpractice victims whose noneconomic damages exceeded the statutory limit. 1 The
Johnson court also found that the statute classified defendants by bestowing a special
benefit on health care providers — limiting their tort liability — not available to other
'tort defendants. 18° In determining which level of equal protection analysis to employ,
the court observed that its interpretation of the minimum scrutiny test required that the
legislative classification not be arbitrary or unreasonable, and that a "fair and substantial
relationship exist between the classification and the legislative purpose."' 8 ' Although this
standard resembled a heightened level of scrutiny, in its analysis theJohnson court applied
minimum scrutiny and found that the statutory cap was "clothed with a presumption of
constitutionality," and that the plaintiffs thus bore the burden of refuting every conceiv-
able legislative basis supporting the cap on awards. 182 Despite the classifications inherent
in the statute, the Johnson court thus found that the limitation was a rational means to
achieve the public goals of ensuring the availability of health care services and maintain-
ing an environment where malpractice insurance is available and used,"" and as such
did not violate equal protection guararatees. 18'
Ontlinent, Limitation an Recovery, supra note 13, at 1339,
174 id.
17t1 See Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985); Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal denied, 474 U.S. 839 (1985); Johnson
v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 lnd. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
See Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Jones v. State 13d. of Medicine,
97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Wright v, Central DuPage
Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978);
Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (1976).
177 Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.1;',.2c1 585 (1980).
"" Id. at 400, 404 N.E.2d at 601. The court found that the Medical malpractice statute did not
violate IND. CoNs'r. art 1, § 23 and art. IV, §§ 22-23, which prohibit special privilege legislation. Id.
at 397, 404 N.E.2d at 600.
'7'a
	
at 397, 404 N.E.2d at 600,
'Bo Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 308, 404 N.E.2d at 600,
1" Id. at 396, 404 N.E.2d at 599.
1" Id. at 400, 404 N.E.2d at 601.
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Both the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the California
Supreme Court have applied the minimum scrutiny test in equal protection challenges
to statutes' 85 similar to the noneconomic damages cap statute upheld in Indiana. 186 In
Hoffman v. United States, 187 the Ninth Circuit held that the California statute limiting
recovery of noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions'" did not violate equal
protection guarantees.'" The lower court noted that. the statute discriminated between
medical malpractice victims with noneconomic loss in excess of the statutory limit and
all other tort victims with similar losses.'" In applying the minimum scrutiny test,'" the
Hoffman court reasoned that the legislation was rationally related to the legitimate state
objective of assuring the continued availability of quality medical care)" Believing that
high insurance premiums adversely affected the availability of quality medical care, the
Ninth Circuit deferred to the state legislature in accordance with the minimal scrutiny
test, finding "plausible" its claim that the cap on noneconomic damages would limit the
rise in malpractice insurance premiums. 193
In Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,'" the California Supreme Court applied the
minimum scrutiny test and upheld the constitutionality of the state's noneconomic dam-
age limitation provision,'" stating that the cap did not violate equal protection guarantees
under either the state or federal constitution,'" The court noted that the statute dis-
criminated between medical malpractice victims and other tort victims, imposing limits
only in medical malpractice cases, arid within the class of medical malpractice victims,
denying complete recovery only to those malpractice plaintiffs with noneconomic dam-
ages exceeding the statutory Limit. 167 In enacting the statute, the court noted that the
legislature was responding to increases in medical malpractice insurance which were
creating serious problems for California's health care system)" According to the court,
these increases threatened to curtail the availability of medical care and created the
189 See Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985); Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal denied, 474 U.S. 893 (1985).
136 See Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
187 Hoffman v. United States. 767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985).
i'" CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1985) ($250,000 limit for noneconomic damages).
"" Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1437. See Comment, Limitation on Recovery, supra note 13, at 1344-45.
19" Id. at 1433.
' 9 ' Id. at 1434-35. The court rejected strict scrutiny because neither a suspect class nor a
fundamental right were involved. Id. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (fundamental
right); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (suspect class).
The court also rejected intermediate scrutiny, noting that the Supreme Court has only applied
intermediate scrutiny to gender-based classifications and classification premised on legitimacy. Id.
See, e.g., Trimble•v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (legitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(gender).
'"2 Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1437 & n.7.
' 93 Id. at 1437,
194 Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal
denied, 474 U.S. 893 (1985).
CAL. CR% CODE § 3333.2 (West Stipp. 1985).
Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 164, 695 P.2d at 684, 211 Gal. Rptr. at 387. The court stated that "we
know of no principle of California — or federal — constitutional law which prohibits the Legislature
from limiting the recovery of damages in a particular setting in order to further a legitimate state
interest." Id. at 161, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
197 Id. at 101, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
198 Id. at 158, 695 P.2cl at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
May 1988]	 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAP 	 677
possibility that many doctors would practice without insurance, thereby leaving patients
who might be injured by such doctors with the prospect of uncollectable judgments.'"
Thus, the court found that the cap was rationally related to the legitimate state objective
of reducing insurance costs and, therefore, the legislation had a reasonable basis for
differentiating between malpractice plaintiffs and all other plain Liffs. 2" The court con-
cluded that although reasonable persons certainly could disagree as to the wisdom of
the provision, it could not say that the law was not rationally related to a legitimate state
interest."'
In Fein, three justices dissented on the grounds that the statutory cap impermissibly
denied severely injured malpractice victims compensation for negligently inflicted
harm." The dissent noted that under the statute, people who suffer severe injuries late
in life may receive up to $250,000 for the resulting loss of enjoyment during their final
years, while infants with identical injuries are limited to the same compensation for their
entire lifetimes," This result, according to the dissent, is a fundamentally arbitrary
classification because the statute concentrates the costs of the worst injuries on a few
individuals, those most severely injured by medical malpractice," whereas it could have
spread the burden among all of the statute's beneficiaries, such as health care consumers
or, more broadly, taxpayers." The dissent further noted that the statutory cap is not
linked to any public benefit because the savings resulting from the cap accrue to the
individual defendant for private use."'" Moreover, the dissent stated that the legislature
had cited no evidence that the medical malpractice victim's sacrifices would result in
appreciable savings to insurance companies because an insignificant number of individ-
uals, about fourteen a year, 207 received jury awards over the statutory cap in both
economic and noneconomic damages combined. 21" Thus, the dissent concluded, no
rational basis exists for singling out the most severely injured victims of medical mal-
practice to pay for the special relief conferred upon health care providers and insurers. 2"
Fein was subsequently appealed to the United States Supreme Court, where it was
dismissed for lack of a substantial federal question.m
In contrast to the results reached by courts applying minimum scrutiny, courts
applying intermediate scrutiny have found that statutory niedical malpractice damage
limitation provisions violate state and federal equal protection guarantees because the
means employed do not substantially relate to the legislative ends. 2 " The intermediate
scrutiny tests applied by these courts differ slightly from the test applied by the United
199 Id.
200 1d. at 162, 695 P.2d at 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
2u 1 Id. at 160, 695 12.2d at 681, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85.
2"2 Id. at 168, 695 P.211 at 687, 211 Cal. Rpm at 39 (Bind, C.J., dissenting).
2 " 3 Id. at 173, 695 P.2d at 691, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 394 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
2" Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
215 Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
706 Id. at 172, 695 13.2c1 at 690, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
267 Id. (Bird, C.J. dissenting) (citing CALIFORNIA AUDITOR GENERAL, 	 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE CRISIS IN CALIFORNIA. 31 (1975)),
209 /d. (Bird, CJ., dissenting).
200 Id. at 175, 695 P.2d at 692, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 395 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
210 Fein v. Perrnanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal, Rptr, 368, appeal
denied, 474 U.S. 839 (1985).
2" See Continent, Limitation on Recovery, supra note 13, at 1340.
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States Supreme Court, which required that the statutory classification serve an important
government purpose and be substantially related to achieving that purpose. 212
In Carson v. Maurer,2 " the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied an intermediate
scrutiny test, requiring that the challenged statutory classification be reasonable and have
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. 2 " The Carson court held
that a statutory limit of $250,000 for pain and suffering and other noneconomic dam-
ages, similar to that upheld in California, violated equal protection guarantees under
the state and federal constitutions.215 The plaintiffs claimed that the statutory limit denied
them equal protection of the laws because it distinguished impermissibly between victims
of medical negligence and victims of other forms of negligence with respect to their
common law rights to full tort recovery. 2 ' 6 The plaintiffs also claimed that, by creating
an arbitrary damage limitation, the statute precluded only the most seriously injured
victims from receiving full compensation for their injuries. 217 In deciding upon the
appropriate level of scrutiny, the court reasoned that although neither a fundamental
right nor a suspect class was involved, the common law right to full recovery in medical
negligence actions enjoyed sufficient status to necessitate a standard of review more
lenient than strict scrutiny but more rigorous than minimum scrutiny. 218
In applying an intermediate scrutiny test, the Carson court examined whether the
distinction between malpractice victims and all other tort victims was reasonable and
whether the classification had a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion:119 The court found that the legislature enacted the statutory cap in order to stabilize
insurance risks and reduce malpractice insurance rates by providing that insurers would
not have to pay out damages for pain and suffering and other items of noneconomic
recovery above the statutory Ihnit. 22" Using the "fair and substantial" relation test, the
court first found that the relationship between the legislation and its goal was tenuous
because noneconomic damages awards historically contributed insignificantly to increases
in insurance premium costs. 22 ' Secondly, the court found that few medical. negligence
victims incurred pain and suffering damages in excess of the $250,000 ca p.222 The court
further found that the cap was unfair and unreasonable because it imposed the burden
of supporting the medical care industry on those most severely injured and most in need
of full compensation.223 Thus, the Carson court held the statutory limitation unconsti-
212 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
215 Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
214 Id. at 932. 424 A.2d at 831.
215 Id. at 944, 424 A.2d at 838. The court ruled that N.H. REv, STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 11 (Sapp.
1979), which limited a medical negligence victim's recovery for pain and suffering to $250,000,
violated state equal protection guarantees under N.H. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 2, 12 (1982). Id.
2 L 6 Carson, 120 N.H. at 931, 424 A.2d at 830.
217
218 Id. at 932, 424 A.2d at 830.
219 id. at 932, 424 A.2d at 830-31.
220 Id. at 941, 424 A.2d at 836.
221 /d. (quoting Note, California's. Medical Inquiry Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection
Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REV, 829, 951 (1979) (correlation between malpractice awards and increasing
insurance premiums negligible because only one-quarter of each premium dollar actually goes
toward tort victim compensation)).
222 Id.
225 Id. at 942, 424 A.2d at 837.
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tutional for its failure to meet the "fair and substantial" relation test in classifying medical
negligence victims. 2 •
In reaching its decision, the Carson court rejected the defendant's claim that the
malpractice damage ceiling was constitutional because it was analagous to the New
Hampshire Worker's Compensation Act, 225 which statutorily supplants a victim's common
law rights of action, 226 The court noted that where the worker's compensation plan
provided a quid pro quo for any recovery rights diminished by the plan, a limitation on
pain and suffering damages recoverable in medical malpractice actions provides no
equivalent benefit. 227 Under worker's compensation schemes such as New Hampshire's,
the injured worker receives a speedy and guaranteed recovery for his injury in return
for the loss of his common law tort rernedy. 228 Thus, the benefits created by the statute
are exchanged for abridged common law benefits, 229 thereby providing employees with
a sufficient quid pro quo. 25° Conversely, damage limitation provisions in medical mal-
practice actions do not provide malpractice victims with a quid pro quo because there is
no guarantee of recovery to the victim in exchange for the limitation of her common
law right. 23 ' Adopting this reasoning, the Carson court was able to distinguish worker's
compensation damage limitations from the statutory noneconomic damages cap in med-
ical malpractice actions. 292
In Detar Hospital a. Estrada, a Texas appellate court held that a statute limiting a
health care provider's medical malpractice liability for all damages to $500,000, not
including past and future necessary Medical expenses, violated the equal protection
clauses of both the state and federal cOnstitutions, 2" The court noted that the Texas
Constitution guaranteed a plaintiff's right to bring a common law cause of action to
recover in tort."' Thus, according to the court, the legislature could not abrogate the
constitutionally guaranteed right to redress absent a showing that the legislative basis
for the statute outweighed the denial of that right. 2"
In choosing the standard of review to evaluate the constitutionality of the statute,
the Estrada court, stated that minimum scrutiny applied because such areas as the right
to recover in tort mandate a restrained standard of review. 2" In its analysis, however,
223 Id. at 943, 424 A.2d at 838.
22''
	
New Hampshire Worker's Compensation Act, N,H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch . 281.
22 " Carson, 120 N.H. at 943, 424 A.2d at 837.
227 14, at 943, 424 A.2d at 837-38.
225 See Learner, Compensation Schemes, supra note 52, at 169.
229 /d. at 170.
2" Id. The quid pro quo doctrine originated in the case of New York Central Railroad v. White,
243 U.S. 188 (1917), There the United State Supreme Court stated that "it perhaps may be doubted
whether the State could abolish all rights of action on the one hand, or all defenses on the other,
without setting up something adequate in their stead." Id. at 201.
In the more recent case of Duke Power v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59
(1978), however, the Supreme Court explicitly refused to decide whether the due process clause
requires the legislature to provide a quid pro quo when it abrogates common law tort remedies. Id.
at 87-88, 93, & n.n. 32, 33.
"' See Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. at 943, 424 A.2d at 837-38.
932 Id .
2" Detar Hosp., Inc. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359, 365 (Tex, Ct. App. 1985). See also Baptist
Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
294 Estrada, 694 S.W.2d at 365.
295
226 Id.
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the court employed an intermediate scrutiny test, requiring that the limitation on a
medical malpractice plaintiff's recovery "promotes" the legislative aims. 237 The aims of
the statute, the court noted, were: to reduce health care liability claim frequency and
severity; to decrease the cost of those claims; and to lower insurance premiums and
medical care costs. 238 The court determined that the statutory limitation on damages did
not promote these aims, as the spiraling increases in the cost of medical care since the
enactment of the statute evidenced. 235 Thus, according to the Estrada court, the statute
unreasonably infringed on a medical malpractice plaintiff's constitutionally guaranteed
right to obtain full redress and therefore violated state and federal equal protection
guarantees.'"
Similarly, in Arneson v. Olson, 24 ' the North Dakota Supreme Court applied an inter-
mediate scrutiny test and held that a statute limiting recovery in medical malpractice
actions to $300,000 violated both state and federal equal protection guarantees."' The
test enunciated by the court required a "close correspondence between statutory classi-
fication and legislative goals."'" The purpose of the statute included ensuring the avail-
ability of competent medical and hospital services at reasonable cost, adequately com-
pensating patients with meritorious claims while eliminating nonmeritorious claims, and
encouraging physicians to enter and remain in practice in North Dakota. 244
In applying the intermediate scrutiny test, the Arneson court examined these legis-
lative aims and found that the limitation on severely injured victim's recovery did not
achieve its enumerated goals.'" The court found that the limitation did not adequately
compensate patients with meritorious claims but instead deprived the most severely
injured medical malpractice victims. 24" The court also determined that the statutory
limitation did not deter nonmeritorious claims. 247 Thus, because the statutory limitation
did not closely correspond with the legislative goals, the legislation failed under inter-
mediate scrutiny analysis and the statutory classification was therefore invalid.'"
In addition to examining the relationship between the statutory classification and
the legislative purposes, the Arneson court also examined the rationale underlying the
statute's goals. 24" Noting that the incidence of medical malpractice claims in North Dakota
was far lower than the national average, that premiums in North Dakota were the sixth
lowest in the country, and that insurance coverage was readily available in the state, the
court concluded that there was no evidence of a medical malpractice insurance crisis in
North Dakota. 25" In the absence of such a crisis, the court held the statutory cap uncoil-
737 Id. at 366.
218 Id.
23 9 Id.
2417 Id.
741
 Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
242 Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 136. The court held that N.D. CENT. CODE. § 26-40-1-11 (1978)
violated N.D. CONST. §1 20, 69, 70, and the fourteenth amendment. Id.
243
 Id. at 135.
244 Id,
245 Id,
' 46 Id.
247 Id. at 135-36.
,48 /(1. at 135.
249 1d. at 136.
2" Id.
"I Id.
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Also, in Graley v. Satayatham, 252 an Ohio court struck down the provisions of Ohio's
Medical Malpractice Act limiting awards for general damages in medical malpractice
actions to $200,000. 253 The Graley court stated that in all equal protection cases the crucial
question is whether an appropriate governmental interest is suitably furthered by the
different treatment of classes of individuals. 254 While the court appeared to enunciate
an intermediate scrutiny test, it never clearly articulated a standard of review because it
found that no appropriate governmental interest was at stake. 253 The Graley court stated
that there was no government interest, "unless it be argued that any segment of the
public in financial distress be at least partly relieved of financial accountability for its
negligence." 23" In noting the absurdity of this proposition, the court said that the legis-
lature could not benefit one class — medical practitioners — by depriving another —
medical malpractice patients — of the equal protection of the laws."' The Graley court
concluded that the statute's special treatment of the medical profession is not available
to lawyers or dentists or others who are also subject to malpractice suits. 25" Thus, the
court invalidated the statute based on the statute's rationale and not on the relationship
between that goal and the statutory means. 259
In Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, another Ohio court followed Graley in holding
that Ohio's $200,000 general damages statutory cap violated the state and federal con-
stitutions. 21" In following Graley, the court noted that it could add nothing of importance
to that decision's equal protection analysis. 2" 1 'Thus, although the Simmt court did not
enunciate a standard of review, it based its unconstitutionality finding on the fact that.
the statutory cap conferred benefits on medical malpractice defendants which were
unavailable to other tort defendants, thereby depriving medical malpractice plaintiffs of
benefits available to other similarly situated plaintiffs. 21'2
In Jones v. State Board of Medicine, the Idaho Supreme Court applied an intermediate
scrutiny test to determine the constitutionality of the state's medical malpractice damage
cap.21i3 The test required that the legislative means chosen have a fair and substantial
relationship to a reasonably conceived public purpose. 2" The Jones court noted that the
statutory classification in question, which distinguished between more severely and less
severely injured malpractice victims, did not involve a fundamental right, and thus strict
252 Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (1976).
2" id. at 321, 343 N,E.2d at 839. The court held that Onto REV. Cone ANN. § 2307,43, which
slates that no amount recovered for general damages in any medical claim, excluding death, shall
exceed $200,000, violated the equal protection clauses of both the United States and Ohio Consti-
tutions. Id.
254 Id. at 320, 343 N.E.2d at 837.
255 Id
25ti
257
2.59 Id
259 Id. at 320, 343 N,E.2c1 at 838.
26') Simon v. St. .Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 166-67, 355 N.E.2d 903, 906
(1976). The Simon court was a Court of Common Pleas of Ohio as was the court in Grote'',
2" Id. at 167, 355 N.E.2d at 906.
252 Id.
"' Juno v. State Bd, of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 871, 555 P.2d 399, 411 (1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S, 914 (1977). The court reviewed the constitutionality of limn° Cone § 39-4204 (1977),
which limited recoverable damages in medical malpractice actions to $150,000 per claim and
$300,000 per malpractice occurrence. Id. at 862, 555 P.2d at 402.
25.4 Id. at 871, 555 P.2d at 411.
682	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 29:659
scrutiny was not applicable. 265 The court also found that minimum scrutiny did not apply
because under that test the "validity or invalidity of discriminating classifications may
.. depend solely upon the extent of the imagination of the reviewing court," and that
an "overindulgent ... blind following" of the legislative will would result in the "abdi-
cation of judicial responsibility." 266
 Thus, the Jones court found it necessary to look
beyond the minimum scrutiny analysis and adopt an intermediate scrutiny test focusing
on legislative means and ends in the context of malpractice medical legislation. 2G7
In accordance with this standard of review, the court remanded the case for a factual
determination concerning whether the legislative means related to the objective of abat-
ing the perceived medical malpractice insurance crisis. 268 Specifically, the Idaho Supreme
Court instructed the trial court to determine whether an increase in medical malpractice
claims caused increased insurance rates, whether malpractice insurance was unavailable
at affordable rates, whether such unavailability caused an insurance crisis in the state,
and whether the statutory cap would solve the perceived insurance crisis. 266
As the foregoing cases demonstrate, the constitutionality of medical malpractice
damage limitation statutes turns on which standard of scrutiny the reviewing court
adopts. Those courts that apply minimum scrutiny have found the statutes constitutional
because they rationally relate to the legitimate state goals of decreasing medical mal-
practice insurance rates and ensuring the availability of quality health care. Courts
applying intermediate scrutiny, however, have invalidated these statutes, holding that
the means employed do not substantially relate to or further the legislative ends.
IV. THE MASSACHUSETTS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY CAP IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A number.of courts have reviewed noneconomic damages caps under intermediate
or minimal scrutiny276 and a majority of them have found these caps unconstitutional
under intermediate scrutiny."' The United States Supreme Court recently refused to
hear an appeal of a case upholding the constitutionality of a statutory cap,"2 thereby
providing no definitive guidance on the issue. Only Justice White dissented from the
vote to deny the appeal, noting that the issue divides the appellate and highest courts
of several states and will arise in every state that enacts a similar statutory provision. 275
With the recent enactment of the statutory cap on medical malpractice liability iii Mas-
sachusetts, a constitutional challenge as Justice White predicted, is likely."' In reviewing
the constitutionality of the statutory cap, the Massachusetts courts should adopt inter-
mediate scrutiny as the proper standard of review and find that the cap provision violates
state and federal equal protection guarantees.
The Carson, Estrada, Arneson, Graley, Simon, and Jones decisions, which held that
damage limitation statutes violated equal protection guarantees because the legislative
265 Id. at 870, 555 P.2d at 410.
26 Id. at 871, 555 P.2d at 411.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 877, 555 P.2d at 417.
268 Id. at 874, 555 P.2d at 414.
278 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
271 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
272 Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal
denied, 474 U.S. 893 (1985),
27s
	
U.S. 893, 894 (White, J., dissenting).
274 Id. at 894 (White, J., dissenting).
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means did not substantially relate to or further the legislative ends, suggest the possibility
of a successful equal protection challenge to section 60H, the $500,000 cap on nonecon-
omic damages in medical malpractice actions. 275 Unlike the statutory caps reviewed by
those courts, which made no special provision for the substantially disfigured or physi-
cally impaired medical malpractice victim, the Massachusetts cap exempts the more
severely injured — those who suffer substantial disfigurement or permanent. loss or
impairment of a bodily function — from the statutory limit. 27" The cap does, however,
discriminate between medical malpractice victims who fall within the statute and all other
tort victims, effectively restricting the common law right of the former group to seek
full redress for injuries arising from medical negligence. 277 The statutory cap also recip-
rocally benefits the medical malpractice tortleasor by limiting his or her liability, thereby
distinguishing between medical malpractice defendants and all other tort defendants. 278
Because section 6011 does discriminate, judicial review is necessary to determine if the
statute offends the equal protection provisions of the Massachusetts and United States
Constitutions.
Equal protection analysis attempts to balance the various interests involved in the
litigation. A court must therefore characterize the pertinent interests affected by the
statutory cap before determining the appropriate standard of review. The medical
malpractice plaintiff has an interest in the common law right to obtain full recovery, as
determined by a jury, For injuries resulting front medical negligence. In contrast, the
state has an interest in limiting the plaintiff's recovery in order to ensure the affordability
and availability of medical malpractice insurance, thereby guaranteeing the availability
of adequate medical services. 279 Thus, whether the statutory cap can be justified under
equal protection analysis depends on whether impairing a medical malpractice plaintiff's
private rights outweighs the projected benefits for the general public. 280 The outcome
of the court's interest, balancing depends on which standard of scrutiny the court adopts.
The United States Supreme Court has restricted its application of intermediate
scrutiny to cases involving classifications based upon gender281 and illegitimacy,"2 while
applying strict or minimum scrutiny to all other classifieations. 283 The Massachusetts
courts generally have employed the same standards as the Supreme Court in reviewing
challenges raised under the state and federal constitutions because they offer virtually
identical equal protection guarantees. 2 N .1 A state court may, however, apply a higher level
'' 5 MAss. Ger. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 601-1 (1088).
276 Id.
"7 See Learner, Compensation Schemes, .supra note 52, at 147.
21 ' See. Graley, 74 Ohio Op. 2d at 320, 343 N.E.2d at 837.
229 See Johnson, 273 hid. at 396, 904 N.E.2d at 500.
2" See Carson, 120 N.H. at 933, 429 A.2d at 831.
28 ' See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender).
242 See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.•762 (1077) (illegitimacy).
203
	 Carson. 120 N.H. at 932, 429 A.2(1 at 831.
244 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. The fourteenth amendment states in part that "No State
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection or the laws." Id.
See Mass. CONST. art. 1, X, XI. Article I states in relevant part, la men are horn free and
equal, and have certain natural, essential, and inalienable rights; that of acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property ..." Article X states in -relevant part, "[e]ach individual of the society has a
right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according to standing
laws." Article XI states in relevant part, "[e]very subject of the commonwealth ought to find a
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of scrutiny when interpreting its constitution, thereby granting individuals more rights
than the federal constitution requires, 285
 The Massachusetts courts should adopt this
approach and apply an intermediate scrutiny Lest when it reviews the constitutionality
of section 60H, just as the courts in five other states have done in reviewing the consti-
tutionality of their statutory cap provisions. 286
Because the group of medical malpractice plaintiffs is not a suspect class and the
common law right to full damages is not a fundamental right, strict scrutiny does not
apply. 287
 Minimum scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny are thus the only alternatives.
Minimum scrutiny requires that the court uphold the statutory classification upon finding
any rational relation to the government interest. 288
 This standard creates a presumption
of constitutionality. 288
 As the Idaho State Supreme court noted in Jones, under minimum
scrutiny a statutory classification's validity may depend on whether the reviewing court
can imagine any rational relation between the classification and the legislative purpose.
Blindly following the legislative will in this manner abdicates judicial responsibility, the
court warns.280
 Deferring to the presumption of constitutionality inherent in minimum
scrutiny, courts fail to examine whether the classification reasonably fits the legislation's
purpose, thereby unfairly penalizing the plaintiff who can demonstrate that the classi-
fication, although rationally related, does not reasonably relate to the purpose. 28 ' Fur-
thermore, as the Carson court noted, although not a fundamental right, the common
law right to a full recovery in medical negligence actions is so important that it deserves
a heightened level of judicial review. 282
 Massachusetts should adopt intermediate scrutiny
when it evaluates section 60H's constitutionality because the provision restricts a plain-
tiff's common law right to full recovery in medical malpractice actions. Such a restriction
should not be upheld through the judiciary's abdication of its duty to examine the
reasonableness of the relationship between the statutory classification and legislative
purpose.
In apparent recognition of the shortcomings inherent in minimum scrutiny analysis,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has indicated a willingness to apply inter-
mediate scrutiny, although this inclination has thus far been expressed in dicta and in
concurring and dissenting opinions. 292
 Some members of the court seem to recognize
certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in
his person, property, or character."
See Commonwealth v. Henry's Drywall Co., 366 Mass. 539, 543, 320 N.E.2d 911, 9l4 (1974)
("Applying these standards, we conclude that § 12913 is a valid exercise of the legislative authority
and is constitutional in that it satisfies both the equal protection and due process clauses of our
Federal Constitution as well as the parallel requirements of our State Constitution."). Thus, the
standards of constitutional review are the same under both constitutions.
255 See Carson, 120 N.I-1. at 932, 424 A.2d at 831.
256 Set. Jones, 97 Idaho at 871, 555 P.211 al 411, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Arneson, 27
N.1.1'.2t1 at 136; Carson, 120 N.H. at 932, 424 A.2d at 831; Graly, 74 Ohio Op. 2d at 320, 343
N.E.2d at 837,
2"7 See Comment, Limitation on Recovery, supra note 13, at 1339.
2A5 See Note, Constitutional Perspective, supra note 3, at 1298.
28" See Relish, Constitutional Implications, supra note 20, at 771.
29°
 See Jones, 97 Idaho at 871. 555 P.2d at 411.
291 See Note, Constitutional Perspective, supra note 3, at 1300.
2" 1 Carson, 120 NIL at 932, 424 A.2d at 830.
29 ' Note, Constitutional Perspective, supra note 3, at 1300. See also Commonwealth v. Henry's
Drywall Co., 366 Mass. 539, 541 n.4, 320 N.E.2d 911, 913 n.4 (1974) (dictum); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Attorney General, 361 Mass. 401, 419-20, 280 N.E.2d 406, 419 (1972) (Hennessey, J., & Tauro,
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that an analysis of equal protection issues requires serious inquiry into the correlation
between statutory classification and purpose, 294 in order to avoid abdicating judicial
responsibility in reviewing legislation
An example of this concern is found in Pinnick v. C/eary. 296 In a concurring opinion,
Chief Justice Tauro stated, "[w]here the existence of a rational basis for legislation whose
constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of judicial notice,
such facts may properly be made the subject of judicial scrutiny." 29' The Chief Justice
further stated that by using evidentiary inquiries, the court might avoid becoming a
"virtual rubber stamp" in upholding the constitutionality of challenged legislation on the
basis of a superficial review of an inadequate record. 298 Also, in Commonwealth v. Henry's
Drywall Co., the court stated in dicta that the burden of proving a statute unconstitutional
may be aided by a "factual foundation established in the record by an evidentiary hearing
or otherwise." 29" In addition, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Attorney General, the dissent found that
the plaintiff's succeeded in establishing the constitutional invalidity of the challenged
statute because their arguments were premised on facts and relevant documents and not
on mere speculation. 36°
Thus, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court appears to recognize that it must
examine the relationship between statutory classification and purpose in order to give
real meaning to state and federal equal protection guarantees. It also recognizes that it
must require the state to produce evidence supporting the probable beneficial effect of
a challenged statute, or conversely, allow plaintiffs to produce evidence refuting the
statute's supposed benefits."U 1 For these reasons, the Massachusetts courts should follow
the courts of New Hampshire,"2 Texas,"" 0111°,3 °4 North Dakota, 303 and Idaho, 306 and
use intermediate scrutiny to review the constitutionality of section 60H. Applying an
intermediate level of review to section 60H, the Massachusetts courts must find the
statute unconstitutional because its classification benefits one group — health care pro-
viders — at the expense of another — medical malpractice victims — without substantially
furthering a legitimate state end as required under intermediate scrutiny analysis."'
Section 60H is designed to reduce medical malpractice insurance premiums, thereby
ensuring its affordability and the availability of quality health care in the Common-
wealth."" The legislature enacted section 60H in response to a much publicized medical
C.J., dissenting); Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 37-38, 271 N.E.2d 592, 614-15 (1971) (Tauro
C.J., concurring).
2" See Note, Constitutional Perspective, supra note 3, at 1300-01.
2"2 See Jones, 97 Idaho at 871, 555 17,2d at 411, cert, denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
296 Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).
297 Id. at 37, 271 N.E.2d at 614 (Tauro, CJ., concurring).
292 Id, at 37, 271 N.E.2d at 614-15 (Tauro, C.J., concurring).
39° See Commonwealth v. Henry's Drywall Co., 366 Mass. 539, 541 n.4, 320 N.E.2d 911, 913
n.4 (1974).
3°° Mobil Oil Corp. v. Attorney General, 361 Mass. 401, 419-20, 280 N.E.2d 406, 419 (1972)
(Hennessey, J., dissenting).
30 ' See Note, Constitutional Perspective, supra note 3, at 1301-02.
343 See Carson, 120 N.H. at 932, 434 A.2d at 825.
311 See Estrada, 694 S.W.2d at 366.
264 See Craley, 74 Ohio Op. at 320, 343 N.E.2d at 837.
2112 See Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 135.
3m See Jones, 97 Idaho at 871, 555 P.2d at 411, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
3° 7 See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
262 See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
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malpractice insurance crisis purportedly afflicting the state. 366 As the North Dakota
Supreme Court found in Arneson,") however, the legislation's rationale may be ques-
tioned because the crisis itself is questionable. 3 " In Massachusetts, the average premium
cost for a physician in 1985 was only 5.2 percent of his or her net income. 312 According
to a comparative study, this percentage was the third lowest among the ten states
studied: 3 " These figures do not represent a malpractice insurance crisis of sufficient
magnitude to restrict a malpractice plaintiff's common law rights in order to benefit
physicians and insurance companies. As the Graley court noted, relieving insurance
companies and physicians of financial accountability for professional negligence because'
of perceived financial distress is absurd. 3 " Every profession or business undergoes dif-
ficult times, and it is not the place of government to manipulate the law in order to
provide financial relief to one class, the medical, while depriving another, malpractice
plaintiffs, of equal protection guarantees. 313 Thus, the legitimacy of the legislative end
may be suspect, considering the questionable validity of the crisis and the fact that the
impetus behind the statutory cap was the Massachusetts Medical Society 3 10
Assuming that the situation in Massachusetts can be termed a crisis, intermediate
scrutiny analysis dictates that section 60H is unconstitutional because the means chosen
by the legislature — a $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages — does not substantially
relate to the purported legislative goal of reducing medical malpractice insurance pre-
miums. As the Carson court found, statutory caps do not substantially relate to the
legislative end because the total amount paid out by insurers in noneconomic damages
contributes insignificantly to insurance premium costs. 317 Only one-quarter of each pre-
mium dollar goes to compensating the tort victim for both economic and noneconomic
damages, while the rest goes to insurer investments, overhead, litigation expenses and
retained earnings. 31 "
Notwithstanding the most severely injured medical malpractice victims, few individ-
uals suffer noneconomic damages in excess of the statutory limit of $500,000. In 1984,
the average medical malpractice jury award in Massachusetts for both economic and
noneconomic damages was $236,848. 316 This figure is half the Massachusetts statutory
cap, which only limits noneconomic damages. In addition, given the fact that studies
have shown and at least one court has determined320 that limits on noneconomic damage
awards have little significant impact on medical malpractice insurance premiums, 32 ' the
3119 See supra note 6.
31° See Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 136 (court found no evidence of malpractice crisis in North
Dakota).
3" See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
312 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
313 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
319
	 74 Ohio Op. at 320,343 N.E.2d at 837.
"3 Id.
316 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
317 See Carson, 120 N.H. at 931,434 A.2d at 836.
318 See Note, Equal Protection Challenge, supra note 221, at 940-41.
319 See 1985 MASS. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 13.
320 See Detar Hosp. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359,365-66 (Tex. Ct. App.) (court noted that costs
of medical care and malpractice premiums continued to increase despite enactment of statutory
cap on damages).
321 See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
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Massachusetts statutory cap does not further the goal of reducing premiums. 322 Thus,
the means employed by the Massachusetts legislature to solve the malpractice insurance
crisis violates equal protection under the intermediate scrutiny test because the provision
does not substantially relate to or further the legislative ends. As the Carson court noted,
the reasonableness of the statute depends on balancing the public benefits against de-
priving the medical victim's right to full compensation. 523
 When the benefits accruing
from a statutory provision such as section 60H cannot be proven, the victim's rights
should not be circumscribed on mere speculation of the provision's effectiveness.
Section 60H can he distinguished from the Massachusetts Worker's Compensation
Act, which restricts a plaintiff's common law right to sue in tort for the negligent infliction
of injury and limits the total amount an injured employee may recover."' Under this
scheme, the injured worker receives a speedy and guaranteed recovery for her injury in
return for the loss of her common law tort remedy. Thus, the statutory benefits are
provided in exchange for the employee's abridged common law benefits, thereby pro-
viding the employee with a sufficient quid pro quo. 325 As the Carson court noted, however,
a statutory damage cap such as section 60H does not provide medical malpractice victims
a quid pro quo because there is no guarantee of recovery to the victim in exchange for
the restriction on his common law rights. 52" Thus, section 6011 is distinguishable from
the statutory limits of the Worker's Compensation Act.
Section 60H is unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny because it discriminates
between similarly situated tort victims without demonstrating a substantial relationship
between the statutory classification and legislative ends. Upholding such a statute denies
a medical malpractice plaintiff full recovery merely because he is a patient, while the
defendant is relieved of full liability merely because she is a health care provider. 522 If
the same plaintiff had been injured by the physician's negligent actions outside the scope
of her professional capacity; that plaintiff would be entitled to recover hill noneconomic
damages, but because he is a patient injured by the physician's medical negligence, he
is denied full recovery of those damages, 528
 This distinction is unfair and unreasonable
because the means which produce this result do not substantially further the ends of
ensuring the affordability of insurance and quality health care. 52" Because of this tenuous
relationship, section 60H violates equal protection guarantees and is therefore uncon-
stitutional under both the Massachusetts and federal constitutions.
CONCLUSION
Massachusetts' attempt to solve the perceived medical malpractice crisis by enacting
section 60H of chapter 231 of the General Laws is likely to be challenged in the courts
on equal protection grounds, as have similar statutes in other states. Like those statutes,
section 60H discriminates between classes of tort victims and classes of tortleasors. Such
5" See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
"3 Carson, 120 N.H. at 933,434 A.2d at 830.
' 24 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch 152, § 26 (1977).
"'See supra notes '225-32 and accompanying text.
3" Carson, 120 N.H. at 943,434 A.2d at 837-38.
533 Comment, Limilation on Recovery, supra note 13, at 1348.
sta
5" See supra notes 517-23 and accompanying text.
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statutory discrimination is constitutional provided the legislation satisfies equal protection
guarantees.
In assessing the constitutionality of section 60H against these guarantees, Massachu-
setts courts should apply intermediate scrutiny which mandates that the legislative means
chosen substantially further or relate to legitimate legislative goals. The legitimacy of the
statute's goals, alleviating the medical malpractice crisis through insurance premium
reductions, is suspect because the characterization of the situation as a crisis is question-
able. Also, statutory limits on medical malpractice awards have not resulted in demonstr-
able insurance premium reductions. Thus, under intermediate scrutiny section 60H
violates equal protection guarantees because the means chosen by the legislature do not
substantially further or relate to the legislative goal. Therefore, Massachusetts courts
should find section 60H unconstitutional.
KEVIN W. CLANCY
